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This paper examines the causal link between education and democracy.   
Motivated by a model whereby educated individuals are in a better position to 
assess the effects of public policies and hence favor democracy where their 
opinions matter, the empirical analysis uses World Values Surveys to study the 
link between education and democratic attitudes.  Controlling for a variety of 
characteristics, the paper finds that higher education levels tend to result in pro-
democracy views.   These results hold across countries with different levels of 
democracy, thus rejecting the hypothesis that indoctrination through education is 
an effective tool in non-democratic countries. 
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JEL Classifications: I20, I30, Y80 
                                                           
* Chong: Inter-American Development Bank.  Email: albertoch@iadb.org; Gradstein: Ben Gurion University, Israel; 
CEPR; CESifo; IZA.  Email: grade@bgu.ac.il; Vanessa Rios provided very able research assistance.   4
1. Introduction 
 
Education, by fostering civic attitudes and cultivating rational informed opinions, has been 
commonly believed to promote pro-democracy views (Mann, 1846; Dewey, 1916).  The more 
recent stipulation by Lipset (1959) that education is a prerequisite of a democratic society was 
echoed by Milton Friedman, “A stable and democratic society is impossible without a minimum 
degree of literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens and without widespread acceptance 
of some common set of values.  Education can contribute to both” (Friedman, 1962, 86).  This 
link is often assumed in theoretical models of economic development as well.  For example, 
Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000, stipulate that education tends to make people more critical of 
the prevailing autocratic regime, thus implying that investment in education by such a regime 
may ultimately undermine it. 
  Empirical work, mostly in a cross-country context, similarly documents a positive 
association between education and democratic institutions (Barro, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007).  This literature, however, has difficulties addressing 
endogeneity and reverse causality.  Also, there is evidence that education is positively related to 
measures of civic participation (Campante and Chor, 2008; Dee, 2004; Glaeser, Ponzetto and 
Shleifer, 2007; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004).
1  A dissenting view is presented in 
Acemoglu et al. (2005), where, when controlling for fixed effects, education turns out to be 
unrelated to democracy; see, however, Bobba and Coviello (2007), for qualifications in regard to 
the econometric technique used.    
  Another important observation, in Lott (1999) is that totalitarian regimes tend to make 
substantial investments in education, presumably as the means of indoctrination.  A theory on 
which this is based, more fully exposed in Lott (1990) provides a link between indoctrination 
through the provision of public schooling and regime legitimacy.  Spilimbergo (2008) finds that 
education acquired in foreign countries promotes democracy domestically, provided that the 
foreign country is democratic; when the foreign country is non-democratic, no effect is detected. 
  In this paper, we make use of international survey data to revisit the relationship between 
education and pro-democracy opinions.  To shape ideas, consider the following two views that 
emerge from the literature discussed above.  One view emphasizes indoctrination, seeing 
                                                           
1 An issue here is that civic participation cannot be readily interpreted as being necessarily pro-democratic—think of 
neo-Nazi rallies, for example.     5
education as a means of promoting attitudes.  Then the ultimate effect on democratic disposition 
depends on the values instilled, which may well differ between democracies and non-
democracies: while the former may promote pro-democratic views, the latter may indoctrinate 
against such views.  An alternative theory, formally developed in the paper, is that education 
reduces the cost of acquiring an informed opinion, needed to assess public policies.  In this case, 
education’s effect on pro-democracy views is positive independently of the regime type, as 
educated individuals have a comparative advantage under democracy in being able to affect 
policies.
2  Thus, while both theories generate a positive effect of education on pro-democracy 
attitudes under democracies, their predictions on this relationship in non-democratic regimes 
differ. 
  We contribute to the understanding of these issues by first formalizing the idea, often put 
forward by educators, that education delivers informational benefits relevant for democracy.  To 
this end, we provide an analytical framework where better judgmental capacity, assumed to be 
correlated with education, leads to better policy choices.  Consequently, better-educated 
individuals have a comparative advantage in a democracy, where popular voice plays a role.  In 
the model, this mechanism ensures that education leads to pro-democracy attitudes.   
  We then examine the World Values Surveys data, which contain detailed questions about 
democratic preferences.  We find that education is correlated with these preferences even after 
controlling for a variety of personal characteristics.  Although reverse causality is much less of 
an issue here than in cross-country settings, and despite employing a relatively rich set of 
personal characteristics as controls, we also use instrumental variables to primarily address 
possibly omitted variables.  The results reaffirm the positive effect of education on pro-
democratic attitudes.  Further, we find that this relationship holds across both democracies and 
non-democracies.  In other words, a country’s level of democracy, when interacted with the level 
of schooling, turns out to be statistically insignificant, contrary to the theory of Lott (1990) that 
educated individuals in non-democratic countries, being subject to intense indoctrination, may be 
less supportive of democracy than less educated individuals. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section presents our analytical framework.  The 
data and empirical strategy are discussed in Section 3.  Our main empirical results are contained 
in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
                                                           
2 This theory is consistent with the view presented in the opening paragraph above.   6
2. Analytical Framework 
 
2.1. The Model 
 
Consider an economy populated with a continuum of citizens of a unit measure, and a ruler; the 
role of the latter is to implement public projects.  The population of individual citizens forms a 
legislature.  The citizens are initially endowed with identical incomes normalized to zero.
3  A 
potent ruler expropriates the individuals’ income and provides a public good.  We let e denote 
the amount of expropriation and b the net benefit from the public good accrued to every citizen.
4  
The benefit is assumed to be ex ante unknown and distributed according to the distribution F(b) 
and lies in the interval [0,∞).    
  The status quo refers to the situation where there is no public good and no expropriation, 
in which b=e=0.  We assume for analytical simplicity that the utilities are linear.  The utilities of 
the citizens and the ruler can then respectively be written as follows: 
 
U = (-e + b)Δ     (1) 
and 
R = e Δ     (2) 
 
where Δ=1 if the ruler is potent, and Δ=0 if she is blocked and the status quo prevails. Note that 
under the first best outcome and without strategic distortions, the public good is provided, and 
the aggregate surplus is b. 
  The level of democracy, denoted v, is the probability of holding the ruler accountable; 1-v 
is the probability with which the ruler acts autonomously.  In the latter case, the public project is 
implemented and expropriation takes place.  In the former case, the ruler submits a proposal on  
whether to carry the project out and on the amount of expropriation.  The project goes through if 
approved by the legislature, but if it is blocked then the status quo prevails. 
  Maintaining a given accountability level is assumed costly for the citizens, and this cost 
differs in relation to their education levels.  The idea is that more accountability requires 
maintaining and processing of diverse sources of information as well as a high level of public 
discourse, the costs of which are smaller for educated people. 
                                                           
3 We will discuss extensions to heterogeneous agents later. 
4 This refers both to pure public goods and to private goods that for a variety of reasons are state provided, such as 
education.  We will refer to all these cases, slightly abusing the terminology, as public goods or public projects.   7
  In particular, the accountability cost function is C(hi,v) = c(hi)v
2/2, c’<0, 0<v<1, where hi 
is individual i’s education, and the assumption on c ensures that better educated individuals incur 
a lower cost for a given level of accountability. 
  In the first stage, individuals set the level of accountability v.  Then, with the probability 1-
v the ruler’s proposal is implemented, whereas with the probability v it undergoes a review by 
the legislature and can be either approved or blocked.  We study the subgame perfect equilibria 




Proceeding backwards, we first examine when the ruler’s proposal is approved.  This will be the 
case when the citizens’ utility under the proposal exceeds the status quo level, or when -e + b > 
0.  It then follows that the realization of the value of the public project that makes the citizens 
just indifferent between approving the proposal and rejecting it is b = e, and the resulting 
probabilities of its rejection and approval, respectively, are F(e) and 1-F(e).    
  For a given level of accountability, the ruler’s expected utility is 
ER = (1-v)e + v∫
∞
e
b edF ) ( = e - veF(e) 
and its maximization with respect to e yields the first order condition 
1 – v(F + eF’) = 0 
 
that determines the amount of expropriation proposed by the ruler; differentiation reveals that it 
decreases in v. 
We then write the citizens’ expected utility as follows: 
EUi(v) = - c(hi) v








b dF e b ) ( ) (      (3) 
Its differentiation yields the first order condition for the favored level of political accountability 
by citizen i:
5 
                                                           









b dF e b ) ( ) ( - [1-v+v(1-F(e)]de/dv = 
- c(hi)v + ∫ −
e
b dF b e
0
) ( ) ( = - c(hi)v + F(e) - [1-vF(e)]de/dv = 0  (4) 
and the second order condition is assumed to hold. Equation (4) implicitly determines v(hi), and 
its total differentiation reveals that ∂v(hi)/∂hi > 0, implying that higher education implies 
increased preference for political accountability.     
  Suppose now that a reduced form version of a political process is used to determine the 
accountability level, whereby a weighted function of individual utilities,∫ di U h i i) ( ω , is 
maximized.  We then let hd denoted the education level of the decisive individual and the first 
order condition is 
 
- c(hd)v + F(e) - [1-vF(e)]de/dv = 0 
 
and total differentiation yields that the more educated the decisive individual the higher is the 
equilibrium level of accountability. 
 Summarizing, 
Proposition 1.  Education is positively associated with individual pro-democracy views and with 
collective support for democracy. 
 
2.3. Education, Policy Assessment, and Pro-Democracy Attitudes 
 
Rulers often use deception, manipulating information to influence citizens’ attitudes in order, for 
example, to affect their voting behavior.  This phenomenon may exist in both democratic and 
non-democratic settings, although Lott (1990, 1999) suggests that it may be particularly relevant 
in the latter.  To illustrate how this may work, suppose now that the population is divided into 
educated and uneducated citizenry, and let μ denote the fraction of the former.  The public good 
is parameterized with q, its quality, so that the distribution of benefits, F(q,b), Fq >0, shifts 
rightwards with an increase in q,   which is assumed to be privately known to the ruler.   9
  In the first stage, the ruler sends a message m(q) about the true value of q, bearing a cost 
of deception that increases in the deviation from the true value, φ(m-q)
2/2, φ>0.
6  This cost 
captures, in particular, social disapproval in case deception is revealed, as well as the resources 
needed for excessive manipulation of information.  The difference between the educated and the 
uneducated individuals is that, while the former behave in a Bayesian manner, critically 
evaluating the message and forming posterior beliefs about the true value, the latter individuals 
are naïve and simply believe the message.  To focus on this difference, we now assume that all 
individuals share equally in the cost of maintaining accountability, c(hi) = 1.  To further simplify, 
we assume that the amount of the ruler’s expropriation, e, is given.
7 
  We will employ the fact that the above game is a special case of the one studied in Kartik, 
Ottaviania and Squintani (2007).  As in that paper, we focus on separating perfect Bayesian Nash 
equilibria.  Adopted to this context, such an equilibrium is defined by educated individuals’ 
beliefs formed under Bayes’ rule and the ruler’s message that maximizes her utility given these 
beliefs and correctly anticipating individuals’ decisions. 
  The analysis proceeds backwards.  The approval rule of the ruler’s proposal by the citizens 
is as before, and it is approved when b>e.  We then write the individual utilities as follows: 








i b m Q dF e b ) ), ( ( ) (     (5) 
where  Qi(m) are individual i’s beliefs and F(Qi ( m),b) is individual i’s assessment of the 
distribution of benefits under these beliefs.  Differentiating, we obtain the first order condition 









i b m Q dF e b ) ), ( ( ) ( = 0  (6) 
Recall that uneducated individuals naively believe the message m; Kartik, Ottaviania and 
Squintani (2007) show that in equilibrium, Bayesian individuals correctly invert the message, 
deducing the true value q.  Thus, Qi(m(q))=m if i is uneducated, and Qi(m(q))=q if i is educated. 
Further, differentiation of (6) reveals that the preferred level of accountability is a decreasing 
function of the perceived quality of the public good, dv/dQi < 0.  
                                                            
6 This assumption is stronger than needed. 
7 This does not affect any of the qualitative results.   10
 Letting  ω(μ) be the relative weight of the fraction of educated individuals, an increasing 



















b m dF e b ) , ( ) ( ] = 0    (7) 
and total differentiation reveals that dv/dm < 0 and that dv
2/dmdμ > 0.  Thus, accountability 
decreases with the level of the message, but less so the greater is the fraction of educated 
individuals. 
  We now employ the fact (see Theorem 1 in Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani, 2007) that 
there is a unique separating equilibrium, with m(q) strictly increasing; we then write the utility of 
the ruler when issuing a message m whereas the true value is q as follows: 
ER(m,q) = -φ(m-q)
2/2 + ω(μ) [(1-v(q))e + v(q)∫
∞
e
b q edF ) , ( ] + 
(1- ω(μ))[(1-v(m))e + v(m)∫
∞
e
b q edF ) , ( ] = -φ(m-q)
2 + e - ω(μ) v(q)eF(q,e) - 
                      (1- ω(μ))v(m)(1-F(q,e))     (8) 
 
where ω(μ) is the relative weight of the fraction of educated individuals, which is an increasing 
function. 
  The first order condition for the equilibrium message is 
-φ(m-q) - (1- ω(μ))(dv(m)/dm)(1-F(q,b)) = 0      (9) 
and the second order condition holds. Note that, since dv(m)/dm < 0, m>q, so that the ruler’s 
message is always exaggerated.  Further, totally differentiating (8) we obtain that dm/dμ < 0, so 
that the extent of exaggeration is a declining function of the fraction of educated individuals. 
  Summarizing these results, 
Proposition 2.  In equilibrium, the ruler’s message about the public good’s quality is 
exaggerated, with the extent of exaggeration decreasing in the fraction of educated individuals.  
Educated individuals favor a higher level of accountability than do uneducated ones, so that the   11
equilibrium level of accountability is an increasing function of the fraction of educated 
individuals. 
These results complement those of the previous sub-section in indicating that educated 
individuals have a comparative advantage in making policy inferences under democracy, even 
when subject to manipulation.  Education, again, is seen to promote democratic preferences, 
which also has implications for the collective choice, so that democracy is more likely to emerge 
the more educated society is.  In this sense, the model results are fully consistent with the 
sentiments by prominent commentators cited above. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
In order to test the empirical implications of the theoretical model, we use the following 
benchmark specification:  
 
ij j ij ij ij u Z X Schooling Democracy + + + = λ γ β    (10) 
In this equation, Democracy is the dependent variable and represents the preference for 
democracy by individual i in country j. According to the model presented above, we focus on 
education of individuals as our main variable of interest (Schooling). We also include vector X 
that represents additional individual-level explanatory variables, vector Z that represents country 
and year dummies, and uij that represents the error term. Thus, we estimate the coefficients β, γ, 
and λ where the latter two are vectors.  
The data come from the World Value Survey (WVS), which is a worldwide survey 
carried out by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) that 
comprises individual cross-national questions on a wide variety of topics, such as the economy, 
politics, foreign policy, and identity, as well as on the socio-economic background of individual 
respondents and his or her attitudes on several topics. Data come from in-person interviews of a 
sampling universe of adult citizens 15 years old and older from different developed and 
developing countries around the world. For our purposes, as we need specific variables related to 
democracy, our sample is composed of around 240,000 individuals (from 85 countries) that were 
surveyed during the so-called third, fourth and fifth waves, between 1994 and 2008.
8 
                                                            
8 The countries along with their respective samples and the wave in which was executed the survey are presented in 
Appendix 1.   12
As measures of our dependent variable, democracy, we use a broad set of proxies. The 
first one is included in the three waves and is regarded as our preferred measure. It answers the 
question: “Would you say having a democratic political system is a very good, fairly good, fairly 
bad or very bad way of governing this country?” The other three proxies considered are included 
in the third and fourth waves only, showing individuals’ agreement, on a scale of 1 to 4, with the 
following statements: (i) “In democracy economic system does not run badly”; (ii) “Democracies 
are good at maintaining order”; and (iii) “Democracy may have problems but is better”. For the 
sake of completeness we use another proxy that is included in the fifth wave only. On a scale 
from 1 to 10, this variable answers the question: “How important is it for you to live in a country 
that is governed democratically?” The five proxies used are described in detail in Table 1. They 
are all categorical variables, and, consequently, the coefficients are estimated using ordered 
probits.
9 
As mentioned above, the most important explanatory variable is years of schooling of 
individuals. We transform the available categorical variable into pseudo years of education 
according to each level attained. Along with our variable of interest, the other explanatory 
variables included in the benchmark specification are the following: age, a dummy variable for 
gender that equals one for women, a dummy variable for marital status that equals one for being 
single, two dummy variables for employment status: employed, and unemployed; a dummy 
variable that equals one when the individuals live with their parents, and a scale of income on 
which the individuals’ household is located according to their perception.
10 
We also use other control variables that are not included in the benchmark specification 
because they significantly reduce the sample. These variables are the following: a categorical 
variable that represents the size of the town of residence, the perceived degree of respect for 
individual human rights in the respondent’s country, and self-positioning on a political scale 
(from left to right). In other regressions, we add to the benchmark specification variables related 
to individuals’ satisfaction with democracy in their own countries. One variable directly 
addresses dissatisfaction with the development of democracy  in the respondent’s country (third 
and fourth wave), and the other asks how democratically the respondent’s country is being 
                                                            
9 Ordinary least squares were also estimated, and results are analogous. 
10 For more details about the definition of these and the following variables presented in this section, see Table 1.   13
governed (fifth wave). Summary statistics of these variables and those described in the preceding 
paragraph are presented in Table 2.  
Additionally, all estimations include country and year dummies, have robust standard 
errors, and are clustered by the country and wave in which the survey was executed. Table 3 
presents a correlation matrix between all our proxies of Democracy and the explanatory 
variables, with corresponding p-values of the coefficients.   
Additionally, for illustrative purposes Figure 1 presents the average years of schooling of 
people that approve and disapprove democracy, using our five proxies, by region (as classified 
by the World Bank). It appears that, across regions, less educated people favor democracy less 
than do more educated people. 
   
4. Regression Results 
 
In Table 4, we present the results of ordered probit regressions using the approval of a 
democratic system as our dependent variable. The first column presents our main results using 
the benchmark specification, and the other columns use the additional explanatory variables as 
explained above. In the four regressions presented, schooling yields a positive statistically 
significant coefficient at one percent. Additionally, being older and male, whether employed or 
unemployed (compared to students, retired and housewives) seems to have a robust negative and 
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.  In the second column, results show that 
residents of large towns and individuals maintaining that human rights are respected in their 
country are more likely to approve of democracy.  
  The corresponding marginal effects of these coefficients are presented in Table 5. For the 
sake of economy we only show the change of an average individual in the sample who believes 
that it is fairly good to have a democratic system.
11  In the first column, one more year of 
schooling implies that the probability of perceiving a democratic system as good (not just fairly 
good) is estimated to increase by 1.2 percentage points. This magnitude is very similar in the 
other columns, with an increase of between 1.1 and 1.4 percentage points. 
  In the last four columns of Table 4 we evaluate the effects of the perception of democracy 
and its interaction with education on the preference for democracy. Individuals not satisfied with 
                                                            
11 Summary statistics presented in Table 2 show that the mean of the variable “Approval of a democratic political 
system” is 3.   14
the way democracy develops in their country approve less of democracy (columns 3 and 4), and 
those who think that their government is more democratic approve of it more than otherwise 
(columns 5 and 6). We also add interactive terms between education and democracy, and they 
yield coefficients that are not statistically significant at conventional levels. This result implies 
that the effect on pro-democracy views is positive independently of the type of regime. This is 
fully consistent with our theoretical model that argues that the informative benefits of education 
are universal across regimes and is not consistent with the implication of Lott (1990) implication 
that totalitarian regimes successfully use education to indoctrinate citizens into supporting the 
regime.  
  To further address this issue, in Table 6 we provide results based on dividing the sample 
into two sub-samples, employing the countries’ average democracy level to this end. In 
particular, in order to estimate the cut-off point used to divide the sample, we use the mean of the 
Democratic Accountability variable of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  Unlike our 
previously used proxy, this variable is available at the country level only. However, it is not 
based on the perception on the individual, but on an exogenous (albeit still subjective) 
assessment of the extent to which a country is democratic.
12 Our results show that in both types 
of countries, the more democratic and the less democratic, the effects of education on the 
preference for democracy are statistically significant, although its coefficient is somewhat 
smaller in the latter case. In Appendix 2, we execute the same exercise for a smaller subsample 
of the least democratic countries, and the results still hold, although the education coefficient 
further drops, indicating that education predicts pro-democratic attitudes in non-democracies, but 
somewhat less well than in democracies.
13 
  The coefficients resulting from the regressions using the other four Democracy proxies 
available are presented in Table 7, and the marginal effects are shown in Appendix 4. The 
coefficients for our variable of interest are again positive and statistically significant at one 
percent. With respect to the other explanatory variables, we find that older individuals tend to 
agree with the idea that democracy may have problems but is better than the alternative (column 
3) and that living in a country governed democratically is important (column 4); but they tend  to 
                                                            
12 Using the median instead of the mean does not change our findings. Similarly, we also used Polity V instead of 
ICRG and our results are qualitatively identical. These additional results are available upon request. 
13 Appendix 3 shows the results of dividing the sample at the individual level, by using the same democracy variable 
employed in the interactions presented in Tables 4 and 5. The results are very similar.    15
disagree with the idea that democracies are good at maintaining order (column 2). As in Table 4, 
being a male or belonging to a higher income level has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on pro-democracy preferences.  
  We find that the coefficient of the town size is positive and statistically significant in two 
of the four regressions presented in Table 7. Living in countries where individuals perceive that 
there is more respect of human rights, or that democracy is sufficiently developed, again has a 
statistically significant and positive effect.      
  Endogeneity may be an issue of concern, primarily because of potentially omitted 
variables. (Notice that, as we deal with democratic attitudes, reverse causality is unlikely here.) 
To address this issue, Tables 8 and 9 present our findings using instrumental variables (IV). In 
both tables we use (i) the savings of the respondent’s family during the previous year and (ii) the 
respondent’s number of children as instrumental variables.  These instruments appear to be 
sensitive. Income and thus savings are typically positively correlated with education; however, 
there is no reason to expect that level of savings may be linked in a consistent way with 
democratic perceptions.  Similarly, while one would expect a negative correlation between the 
number of children and the individual’s education level, the former is unlikely to be directly 
correlated with democratic perceptions.
14 
  In Table 8 we present the benchmark specification of Table 4 as well as an additional 
specification that includes additional explanatory variables (but reduces the sample size 
dramatically). This table also includes the marginal effects of a change from the mean, in this 
case, the probability increase of being in category 4 (thinking that having a democratic political 
system is a very good way of governing the country). In both regressions the effect of schooling 
on preference for democracy is the same as before: a coefficient that is positive and statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The marginal effect of education is somewhat smaller than the 
one without instrumental variables. The probability of the belief that having a democratic 
political system is good, not just fairly good, increases by 1.3 and 1.2 percentage points, in 
columns 2 and 4, respectively.  From the last row of this table, which presents the corresponding 
p-value significance of both instruments, it is seen that they are statistically significant.
15 
                                                            
14 China may be considered an outlier. When excluding this country from our sample our results do not change. 
15 Also, corresponding tests of exclusion restrictions show that the instruments employed are good ones.   16
  In Table 9 we present the results of the benchmark specification using the other four 
proxies of Democracy. We also include in this table the marginal effects. The education 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and the marginal effects are smaller but also 
result statistically significant. The first stage regressions of Table 8 and 9 are presented in 
Appendix 5. In those regressions the corresponding coefficients have the expected signs: less 
educated individuals have a larger number of children than more educated ones; and families of 
less educated individuals just get by or spend savings. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The relationship between education and democracy has been a long standing subject of interest, 
both theoretically and empirically.  Influential commentators have suggested mechanisms 
through which education may promote democracy, and the link between the two has been well 
documented in the recent literature.  Discerning the causal impact of education, however, has 
proved difficult because of endogeneity issues.  Further, suggestions have been made that 
education may promote democracy under democratic regimes only, whereas in non-democratic 
setting the effect might reverse itself. 
  In this paper, therefore, we attempt to make a twofold contribution.  Using rich survey 
data, we study whether education promotes pro-democratic preferences; and whether this effect 
differs across countries with different levels of democracy.  Our theoretical model, formalizing 
the sentiment that education confers informational advantages, essential for democracy, suggests 
that educated individuals have a comparative advantage in a democracy in translating their 
(better) judgment of public policies into action.  This informational advantage emerges even 
when the ruler uses deception to misinform the population in order to tilt outcomes to his own 
advantage.  Consequently, the educated favor democracy more than less educated individuals.   
  The empirical part tests the main implications of our analysis using individual level data 
from across the globe.  We find a positive effect of education on pro-democratic attitudes, using 
a variety of proxies for the latter, personal characteristics as controls, and also addressing 
endogeneity issues.  For example, one more year of schooling implies an increase in the 
likelihood of perceiving a democratic system as good, as opposed to fairly good, by more than 
one percentage point.  Moreover, the effect exists regardless of a country’s level of democracy,   17
suggesting that the possible use of education for indoctrination purposes in non-democratic 
environments may have limited consequences. 
  Based on survey data, this research complements previous efforts that find a positive 
effect of education on measures of civic participation.  Whereas the latter are often interpreted as 
being correlated with democracy, the relationship is not straightforward, as one could imagine 
social activities whose nature is precisely anti-democratic.  In this sense, findings presented here 
offer yet another, and one that is perhaps more direct, on how education may affect democracy.  
Additionally, this study questions the view that education promotes democratic views only under 
democracies, as the effect identified here appears to hold universally.  We view this second result 
as casting doubt on the indoctrinating potential of education in non-democratic settings.    
  In future work, it would be interesting to disintegrate the analysis by the respondent’s 
occupation and sector of employment.  This has the potential of relating the link between 
education and democratic preferences to the respondents’ affiliation with the governing regime.  
For instance, bureaucrats, army officers, and governing party members in non-democratic 
environments may exhibit preference that depend more on their occupation and employment than 
on education.     
   18
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Figure 1. Schooling and Approval of Democracy 
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Table 1. Variables Description 
 
Variable Description 
Individual Level Variables 
Approval of a democratic 
political system 
The question in the survey is as follows: Would you say it is a (1) very good, (2) fairly 
good, (3) bad or (4) very bad way of governing this country having a democratic political 
system. This variable scale was changed to: (1) very bad – (4) very good.  Source: World 
Value Surveys (Third, Fourth and Fifth Waves). 
Agreement with opinion that 
says that in democracy 
economic system does not 
run badly 
The question in the survey is: Could you please tell me if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, 
(3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree with this statement “In democracy economic system 
runs badly”. Source: World Value Surveys (Third and Fourth Waves). 
Agreement with opinion that 
says that democracies are 
good at maintaining order 
The question in the survey is: Could you please tell me if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, 
(3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree with this statement “Democracies aren’t good at 
maintaining order”. Source: World Value Surveys (Third and Fourth Waves). 
Agreement with the opinion 
that says that democracy 
may have problems but is 
better 
The question in the survey is: Could you please tell me if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, 
(3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree whit this statement “Democracy may have problems 
but is better than any other form of government”. This variable scale was changed to: (1) 
strongly disagree – (4) agree strongly. Source: World Value Surveys (Third and Fourth 
Waves). 
Importance of living in a 
country that is governed 
democratically 
The question in the survey is: How important is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means “it is not important at all” and 10 
means “absolutely important”. Source: World Value Surveys (Fifth Wave). 
Schooling 
 
The exact question in the survey is: What is the highest educational level that you have 
attained? (1) Inadequately completed elementary education, (2) Completed (compulsory) 
elementary education, (3) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (4) 
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (5) Incomplete secondary: 
university-preparatory, (6) Complete secondary: university-preparatory, (7) Some 
university without degree/higher education, (8) University with degree/higher education. 
This variable was changed to one with pseudo years of education, according to each level: 
To (1) we assigned 3 years of schooling; to (2), 6; to (3), 8.5; to (4), 11; to (5), 12.5; to (6), 
14; to (7), 13.5; and to (8), 16. Source: World Value Surveys (Third, Fourth and Fifth 
Waves). 
Age Respondent’s  age.  Source: World Value Surveys (Third, Fourth and Fifth Waves). 
Gender  Gender of the respondent. (1) Female and (0) Male. Source: World Value Surveys (Third, 
Fourth and Fifth Waves).  
Marital status  2 dummies: (1) Married, living together as married, divorced, separated or widowed, and 
(2) Single. In all the regressions (1) is the omitted dummy. Source: World Value Surveys 
(Third, Fourth and Fifth Waves). 
Employment status  Employment status composed of 3 dummies: (1) Employed (Part or full time) and Self-
employed; (2) Retired/pensioned, Housewife not otherwise employed, and Student; and (3) 
Unemployed. In all the regressions, dummy (2) is omitted. Source: World Value Surveys 
(Third, Fourth and Fifth Waves). 
Scale of income 
 
A scale of incomes in which the household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. 
This variable takes values from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest decile and 10 the highest. The 
data is recollected in local currency, scaled and then aggregated so the deciles represent a 
country level income ranking.  Source: World Value Surveys (Third, Fourth and Fifth 
Waves). 
Size of town  Categorical variable: (1) Under 2,000; (2) 2-5,000; (3) 5-10,000; (4) 10-20,000; (5) 20-
50,000; (6) 50-100,000; (7) 100-500,000; and (8) 500,000 and more. Source: World Value 
Surveys (Third, Fourth and Fifth Waves).   22
Variable Description 
Respect of human rights in 
own country 
The question in the survey is: How much respect is there for individual human rights 
nowadays in this country? Do you feel there is: (1) A great deal of respect for individual 
rights, (2) Fairly much respect, (3) Not much respect, and (4) No respect at all. This 
variable scale was changed to: (1) No respect at all – (4) A great deal of respect (...).
Source: World Value Surveys (Third, Fourth and Fifth Waves). 
Self positioning in political 
scale 
How the respondent place his/her views on the scale from (1) Left to (10) Right.  Source: 
World Value Surveys (Third, Fourth and Fifth Waves). 
No satisfaction with the way 
democracy develops  
The question in the survey is: On the whole are you very satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country? (1) Very satisfied, (2) 
Rather satisfied, (3) Not very satisfied, and (4) Not at all satisfied. Source: World Value 
Surveys (Third and Fourth Waves). 
Democracy in own country  The question in the survey is: How democratically is this country being governed today? 
Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means 
that it is “completely democratic”, what position you use? Source: World Value Surveys 
(Fifth Wave). 
Number of children  Number of children, where 0 means no children. Source: World Value Surveys (Third, 
Fourth and Fifth Waves). 
Savings  4 dummies that answer to the question: During the past year, did your family: (1) Save 
money, (2) Just get by, (3) Spent some savings, and (4) Spent savings and borrowed 
money. The omitted category is the first one. Source: World Value Surveys (Third, Fourth 
and Fifth Waves). 
Country Level Variables 
Democratic Accountability  This is a measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less 
responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a 
democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one. Average for five years, 
including the year when the individual was surveyed. Source: ICRG.   23
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Approval of a democratic political system  168,542  3.3660  0.7219  1  4 
Agreement with opinion that says that in 
democracy economic system does not run badly 
99,476 2.7430 0.7914  1  4 
Agreement with opinion that says that democracies 
are good at maintaining order 
101,648 2.7352  0.8124  1  4 
Agreement with the opinion that says that 
democracy may have problems but is better 
103,346 3.2669  0.7353  1  4 
Importance of living in a country that is governed 
democratically 
49,204 8.6028 1.9138  1  10 
Schooling 168,542  10.6126  4.1992  3  16 
Age  168,542 40.7457 15.8711  15  99 
Gender: Female  168,542  0.5026  0.5000  0  1 
Marital Status: Single  168,542  0.2485  0.4321  0  1 
Living with her parents  168,542  0.2727  0.4453  0  1 
Employment status: Employed  168,542  0.5428  0.4982  0  1 
Employment status: Unemployed  168,542  0.0924  0.2896  0  1 
Scale of income  168,542  4.6327  2.4031  1  10 
Size of town  118,529  4.9526  2.4838  1  8 
Respect of human rights in own country  125,978  2.5779  0.8752  1  4 
Self-positioning in political scale 129,160  5.6894  2.3777  1  10 
Satisfaction with the way democracy develops  71,819  2.4111  0.8322  1  4 
Democracy in own country  45,647  6.4195  2.4270  1  10 
Savings: Family saved money   132,582  0.2388  0.4264  0  1 
Savings: Family just got by  132,582  0.4910  0.4999  0  1 
Savings: Family spent some savings  132,582  0.1469  0.3540  0  1 
Savings: Family spent savings and borrowed 
money 
132,582 0.1234  0.3288  0  1 
Number of children  162,544  1.9154  1.7958  0  20 
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living in a 
country that is 
governed 
democratically 
0.038 0.0857  0.0802  0.026  0.0733  Schooling 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.0067 -0.0097  -0.0393  0.0342  0.0521  Age 
0.006 0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.0386 -0.0437  -0.026  -0.0254  -0.0111  Gender: Female 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.013 
0.0239 0.0168  0.028  -0.0085  -0.0111  Marital Status: Single 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.006  0.014 
0.0074 -0.017  -0.0027  -0.0159  -0.0534  Living with her parents 
0.002 0.000  0.382  0.000  0.000 
0.0164 0.0491  0.047  0.014  0.0145  Employment status: 
Employed  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
-0.0174 -0.0423  -0.0245  -0.0228  -0.035  Employment status: 
Unemployed  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0693 0.1213  0.1033  0.0508  0.0624  Scale of income 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0173 0.0185  0.0206  0.0138  0.0654  Size of town 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.1371 0.1282  0.1389  0.1208  0.0988  Respect of human rights in 
own country  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0041 0.0115  -0.006  0.0296  0.0389  Self-positioning in political 
scale  0.138 0.001  0.087  0.000  0.000 
0.2169 0.1581  0.1657  0.1632  -  Satisfaction with the way 
democracy develops  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000     
0.1024 -  -  -  0.2332  Democracy in own country 
0.000           0.000 
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Table 4. Schooling and Approval of a Democratic Political System (Coefficients) 
 
  Ordered Probit Regressions (Coefficients) 
  Dependent variable: Approval of a democratic political system 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
0.030*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.026***  0.020***  Schooling 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004)  (0.006) 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***  0.004***  Age 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
-0.068*** -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.044***  -0.043***  Gender: Female 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) 
0.023*  0.022 0.017 0.017 0.008  0.008  Marital Status: Single 
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022)  (0.022) 
-0.007 -0.023 -0.009 -0.009 0.005  0.005  Living with her parents 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024)  (0.024) 
-0.008 -0.043***  -0.031**  -0.032**  -0.016  -0.016  Employment status: 
Employed  (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)  (0.020) 
-0.042** -0.076***  -0.084***  -0.084***  -0.000  -0.000  Employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027)  (0.027) 
0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***  0.005  0.005  Scale of income 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)  (0.007) 
 0.009**         Size of town 
 (0.004)        
 0.153***         Respect of human rights in 
own country   (0.019)        
 0.006         Self-positioning in political 
scale   (0.007)        
   0.213***  0.271***     Satisfaction with the way 
democracy develops     (0.027)  (0.067)     
     -0.006     Satisfaction with the way 
democracy develops * 
Schooling       (0.005)    
     0.049***  0.038***  Democracy in own country 
     (0.009)  (0.014) 
      0.001  Democracy in own country * 
Schooling        (0.001) 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Region  dummies  No No No No No  No 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Waves  3, 4, 5  3, 4, 5  3,4  3,4  5  5 
Observations  168,542  66,661 71,819 71,819 45,647  45,647 
Number of Country Waves 
(clusters) 
140  80 67 67 37  37 
Pseudo  R2  0.0642 0.0776 0.0780 0.0781 0.0581  0.0581 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are clustered by country and corresponding survey wave. 
The row called “Waves” specifies the survey waves included in the sample. In column (1), for example, the 
regression only includes the 3
rd, 4
th and 5
th waves of the survey. See appendix 1 for correspondence of survey wave 
and year of survey.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   26
Table 5. Schooling and Approval of a Democratic Political System (Marginal Effects) 
 
  Ordered Probit Regressions (Marginal Effects, =4) 
  Dependent variable: Approval of a democratic political system 
    (1) (2) (3) (5) 
0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011***  Schooling 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***  Age 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.027*** -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.017***  Gender: Female 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
0.009*  0.009 0.007 0.003  Marital Status: Single 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
-0.003 -0.009 -0.004 0.002  Living with her parents 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
-0.003 -0.017***  -0.013**  -0.006  Employment status: Employed 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
-0.017** -0.030***  -0.033***  -0.000  Employment status: Unemployed 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.002  Scale of income 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 0.004**     Size of town 
 (0.002)    
 0.061***     Respect of human rights in own country 
 (0.008)    
 0.002     Self-positioning in political scale 
 (0.003)    
   0.085***   Satisfaction with the way democracy 
develops     (0.011)   
    0.019***  Democracy in own country 
    (0.004) 
Waves (clusters)  3, 4, 5  3, 4, 5  3,  4  5 
Observations  168,542  66,661 71,819 45,647 
Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of choosing the fourth category. Column (4) corresponds to 
the marginal effects of column (5) in Table 4. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are 
clustered by country and corresponding survey wave. The row called “Waves” specifies the survey waves included 
in the sample. In column (1), for example, the regression only includes the 3
rd, 4
th and 5
th waves of the survey. See 
appendix 1 for correspondence of survey wave and year of survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Education and Measures of Preference for Democracy by sub-samples  
 
 Ordered  Probit  Regressions 
  Dependent variable: Approval of a democratic political system 
 
ICRG - Democratic Accountability 
<= mean (4.3) 
ICRG - Democratic 
Accountability > mean (4.3) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  
Coefficient Marginal  Effect  (=4) Coefficient Marginal  Effect 
(=4) 
0.021*** 0.008***  0.036***  0.014***  Schooling 
(0.003) (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
0.003*** 0.001***  0.006***  0.002***  Age 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-0.041*** -0.016***  -0.084***  -0.033***  Gender: Female 
(0.014) (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.005) 
0.017 0.007  0.030  0.012  Marital Status: Single 
(0.015) (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.007) 
-0.008 -0.003  -0.003  -0.001  Living with her parents 
(0.020) (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.007) 
0.014 0.006  -0.011  -0.005  Employment status: Employed 
(0.017) (0.007)  (0.015)  (0.006) 
-0.015 -0.006  -0.048*  -0.019*  Employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.018) (0.007)  (0.029)  (0.012) 
0.017*** 0.007***  0.021***  0.008***  Scale of income 
(0.006) (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 68,149  68,149  88,025  88,025 
Country Waves (clusters) 51    80   
Pseudo R2  0.0758     0.0558    
To estimate the sub-samples, we use the mean value of the variable “Democratic Accountability Index” (from 
ICRG). The cut-off point is shown in the table; corresponding definitions of variables are shown in Table 1. 
Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of choosing the fourth category. Robust standard errors are 




th). See appendix 1 for correspondence of survey wave and year of survey. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.    28
Table 7. Education and Measures of Preference for Democracy (Coefficients) 
 
  Ordered Probit Regressions (Coefficients) 
  Dependent variable:  
  Agree with "In democracy, 
economic system does not 
run badly" 
Agree with "Democracies 
are good at maintaining 
order" 
Agree with "Democracy 
may have problems but is 
better" 
Importance of living in 
a country that is 
governed 
democratically 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
0.027*** 0.033***  0.027***  0.031***  0.027*** 0.030***  0.031***  0.039***  Schooling 
(0.003) (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
0.001 0.000  -0.001***  -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***  0.006***  Age 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
-0.086*** -0.092***  -0.044***  -0.031**  -0.046*** -0.049***  -0.030*  -0.033  Gender: Female 
(0.011) (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.010) (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.025) 
0.040** 0.035* 0.018 -0.001 -0.014 -0.035  -0.003  -0.019  Marital Status: Single 
(0.016) (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.014) (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.031) 
-0.044*** -0.057***  -0.039***  -0.045** 0.008  0.025  0.000 -0.003  Living with her 
parents  (0.015) (0.021)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.014) (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.024) 
0.010  0.003 0.016 0.020 0.002 -0.017  0.003  -0.014  Employment status: 
Employed  (0.011) (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.028) 
-0.076*** -0.079**  -0.038** -0.048*  -0.029 -0.047  -0.023  -0.071  Employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.017) (0.031)  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.022) (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.054) 
0.032***  0.032*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.018***  0.008  -0.003  Scale of income 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
 0.005    0.010**    0.012***    0.014  Size of town 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.009) 
  0.090***  0.083***  0.100***    0.028  Respect of human 
rights in own country    (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.022)    (0.031) 
 0.014*    -0.004    0.020**    0.018  Self-positioning in 
political scale    (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.010)    (0.013) 
  0.135***  0.123***  0.156***      Satisfaction with the 
way democracy 
develops 
  (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.027)     
          0.099***  Democracy in own 
country            (0.015) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Waves 3,4  3,4  3,4  3,4 3,4 3,4 5  5 
Observations 105,417  42,415  107,692 42,914 108,941 43,520 52,766  23,310 
Number of Country 
Waves (clusters) 
97  54 98 54 97 54  39  26 
Pseudo R2  0.0433  0.0548  0.0424  0.0595 0.0621 0.0966  0.0295  0.0436 
 Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are clustered by country and corresponding survey wave. The row 
called “Waves” specifies the survey waves included in the sample. In column (1), for example, the regression only includes the 
3
rd and 4
th waves of the survey. See appendix 1 for correspondence of survey wave and year of survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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Table 8. Education and Approval of a Democratic Political System, IV estimates 
 
  Ordered Probit Regressions and Instrumental Variables 
  Dependent variable: Approval of a democratic political system 




Coefficient Marginal  Effect 
(=10) 
0.032*** 0.013***  0.030*  0.012*  Schooling 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.016)  (0.006) 
0.004*** 0.002***  0.004**  0.002**  Age 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.001) 
-0.064*** -0.026*** -0.064***  -0.025***  Gender: Female 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.017)  (0.007) 
0.023 0.009 0.032  0.013  Marital Status: Single 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.025)  (0.010) 
-0.006 -0.002 -0.029  -0.011  Living with her parents 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.023)  (0.009) 
-0.013 -0.005  -0.056*  -0.022*  Employment status: Employed 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.029)  (0.012) 
-0.042** -0.017**  -0.110***  -0.044***  Employment status: Unemployed 
(0.019) (0.008) (0.030)  (0.012) 
0.011** 0.004**  0.010  0.004  Scale of income 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.009)  (0.004) 
   0.007  0.003  Size of town 
   (0.006)  (0.002) 
   0.102***  0.041***  Respect of human rights in own country 
   (0.023)  (0.009) 
   -0.000  -0.000  Self-positioning in political scale 
      (0.008)  (0.003) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Waves  3, 4, 5  3, 4, 5  3, 4, 5  3, 4, 5 
Observations 129,506  129,506  39,224  39,224 
Number of Country Waves (clusters) 112    50   
Pseudo R2  0.0576    0.0634   
Instruments Significance  
(1st stage, P-value)  0.000  0.000   
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are clustered by country and corresponding survey wave. 
These are the results of the second stage regressions. In the first stages, education is explained by all the other 
controls presented here and the excluded instruments: family savings and number of children. The results of the first 
stages are presented in Appendix 4.  Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of choosing the fourth 
category. The row called “Waves” specifies the survey waves included in the sample. In column (1), for example, 
the regression only includes the 3
rd and 4
th waves of the survey. See appendix 1 for correspondence of survey wave 
and year of survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Education and Measures of Preference for Democracy IV Estimates 
 
 Ordered  Probit  Regressions  and Instrumental Variables 
  Dependent variable:  
 
Agree with "In 
democracy, economic 
system does not run 
badly" 
Agree with 
"Democracies are good 
at maintaining order" 
Agree with "Democracy 
may have problems but 
is better" 
Importance of living in 
a country that is 
governed 
democratically 














0.019* 0.004*  0.023***  0.005***  0.020* 0.008*  0.036***  0.014***  Schooling 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) 
0.000 0.000 -0.001  -0.000  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002***  Age 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
-0.080*** -0.018*** -0.055*** -0.013*** -0.036*** -0.014***  -0.032*  -0.013*  Gender: Female 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005) (0.018) (0.007) 
0.049** 0.011**  0.029*  0.007*  -0.010 -0.004 -0.018 -0.007  Marital Status: 
Single  (0.020) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.019) (0.007) (0.022) (0.009) 
-0.038** -0.008** -0.031** -0.007** 0.017  0.007  -0.011  -0.004  Living with her 
parents  (0.017) (0.004) (0.015) (0.003) (0.017) (0.006) (0.018) (0.007) 
0.016 0.004 0.012 0.003 -0.006 -0.002 0.006  0.002  Employment 
status: Employed  (0.015) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.016) (0.006) (0.024) (0.010) 
-0.067*** -0.015***  -0.040**  -0.009**  -0.017 -0.006 -0.017 -0.007  Employment 
status: 
Unemployed  (0.019) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.023) (0.009) (0.039) (0.016) 
0.030*** 0.007*** 0.022*** 0.005***  0.016** 0.006**  0.004  0.002  Scale of income 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  No No Yes Yes No No 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Waves  3, 4  3, 4  3, 4  3, 4  3, 4  3, 4  5  5 




71  72  71  37  
Pseudo  R2  0.0395  0.0334  0.0571  0.0274  
Instruments 
Signficance (1st 
stage,  P-value) 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are clustered by country and corresponding survey wave. These 
are the results of the second stage regressions. In the first stages, education is explained by all the other controls presented 
here and the excluded instruments: family savings and number of children. The results of the first stages are presented in 
Appendix 4.  Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of choosing the fourth category, for columns (1) to (6), 
and the 10
th category, for columns (7) and (8). The row called “Waves” specifies the survey waves included in the sample. 
In column (1), for example, the regression only includes the 3
rd and 4
th waves of the survey.  See appendix 1 for 
correspondence of survey wave and year of survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Albania  999  1,000  0  1,999  Korea, Rep.  1,249  1,200  1,200  3,649 
Algeria  0  1,282  0  1,282  Latvia  1,200  1,013  0  2,213 
Argentina  1,079  1,280  1,002  3,361  Lithuania  1,009  1,018  0  2,027 
Armenia  2,000  0  0  2,000  Luxembourg  0  1,211  0  1,211 
Australia  2,048  0  1,421  3,469  Malaysia  0  0  1,201  1,201 
Austria  0  1,522  0  1,522  Mali  0  0  1,534  1,534 
Azerbaijan  2,002  0  0  2,002  Malta  0  1,002  0  1,002 
Bangladesh  1,525  1,500  0  3,025  Mexico  2,364  1,535  1,560  5,459 
Belarus  2,092  1,000  0  3,092  Moldova  984  1,008  1,046  3,038 
Belgium  0  1,912  0  1,912  Morocco  0  2,264  1,200  3,464 
Brazil  1,149  0  1,500  2,649  Netherlands  0  1,003  1,050  2,053 
Bulgaria  1,072  1,000  1,001  3,073  New Zealand  1,201  0  954  2,155 
Burkina Faso  0  0  1,534  1,534  Nigeria  1,996  2,022  0  4,018 
Canada  0  1,931  0  1,931  Norway  1,127  0  0  1,127 
Chile  1,000  1,200  1,000  3,200  Pakistan  733  2,000  0  2,733 
China  2,280  1,000  3,242  6,522  Peru  1,211  1,501  1,500  4,212 
Colombia  6,025  0  3,025  9,050  Philippines  1,200  1,200  0  2,400 
Croatia  1,196  1,003  0  2,199  Poland  1,153  1,095  1,000  3,248 
Cyprus  0  0  1,050  1,050  Portugal  0  1,000  0  1,000 
Czech 
Republic 
1,147  1,908  0  3,055  Romania  1,239  1,146  1,776  4,161 
Denmark  0  1,023  0  1,023  Russian 
Federation 
2,040  2,500  2,033  6,573 
Dominican 
Republic 
417  0  0  417  Saudi Arabia  0  1,502  0  1,502 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
0  3,000  3,051  6,051  Singapore  0  1,512  0  1,512 
El Salvador  1,254  0  0  1,254  Slovak Republic  1,095  1,331  0  2,426 
Estonia  1,021  1,005  0  2,026  Slovenia  1,007  1,006  1,037  3,050 
Ethiopia  0  0  1,500  1,500  South Africa  2,935  3,000  2,988  8,923 
Finland  987  1,038  1,014  3,039  Spain  1,211  2,409  1,200  4,820 
France  0  1,615  1,001  2,616  Sweden  1,009  1,015  1,003  3,027 
Germany  2,026  2,036  2,064  6,126  Switzerland  1,212  0  1,241  2,453 
Ghana  0  0  1,534  1,534  Tanzania  0  1,171  0  1,171 
Greece  0  1,142  0  1,142  Thailand  0  0  1,534  1,534 
Hong Kong, 
China 
0  0  1,252  1,252  Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0  0  1,002  1,002 
Hungary  650  1,000  0  1,650  Turkey  1,907  4,607  1,346  7,860 
Iceland  0  968  0  968  Uganda  0  1,002  0  1,002 
India  2,040  2,002  2,001  6,043  Ukraine  2,811  1,195  1,000  5,006 
Indonesia  0  1,004  2,015  3,019  United Kingdom  1,093  2,000  1,041  4,134 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
0  2,532  2,667  5,199  United States  1,542  1,200  1,249  3,991 
Iraq  0  2,325  2,701  5,026  Uruguay  1,000  0  0  1,000 
Ireland  0  1,012  0  1,012  Venezuela, RB  1,200  1,200  0  2,400 
Israel  0  1,199  0  1,199  Vietnam  0  1,000  1,495  2,495 
Italy  0  2,000  1,012  3,012  Zambia  0  0  1,500  1,500 
Japan  1,054  1,362  1,096  3,512  Zimbabwe  0  1,002  0  1,002 
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Appendix 2. Education and Democracy for the Least Democratic Countries 
 
 Ordered  Probit  Regressions 
  Dependent variable: Approval of a democratic political system 
  ICRG - Democratic Accountability <= 3 
 (1)  (2) 
  
Coefficient Marginal  Effect  (=4) 
0.011*** 0.004***  Schooling 
(0.004) (0.002) 
0.002* 0.001*  Age 
(0.001) (0.000) 
-0.037 -0.015  Gender: Female 
(0.023) (0.009) 
0.006 0.002  Marital Status: Single 
(0.024) (0.009) 
0.004 0.002  Living with her parents 
(0.029) (0.012) 
0.024 0.009  Employment status: 
Employed  (0.031) (0.012) 
-0.010 -0.004  Employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.041) (0.016) 
0.019*** 0.007***  Scale of income 
(0.007) (0.003) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Observations 25,599  25,599 
This sub-sample includes those countries with the lower “Democratic Accountability Index” (from 
ICRG): Saudi Arabia, Iraq, VietNam, Pakistan, Belarus, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Egypt, Singapore, Uganda, 
China, Nigeria, Hong Kong, and the Russian Federation. Definitions of the variables are shown in Table 
1. Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of choosing the fourth category. Robust 
standard errors are presented in parentheses. The row called “Waves” specifies the survey waves included 
in the sample. See appendix 1 for correspondence of survey wave and year of survey. We replicated this 
same exercise at the country level and find similar results for several countries, although not for all, 
among the latter, China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Results are clustered by country and wave.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix 3. Measures of Preference for Democracy and Education by Sub-Samples  
 
  Ordered Probit Regressions 
  Dependent variable: Approval of a democratic political system 
 
Satisfaction with democracy is <= 
mean (2.4) 
Satisfaction with 
democracy is > mean (2.4) 
Democracy in the country is 
<= mean (6.4) 
Democracy in the country is > 
mean (6.4) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  






Coefficient Marginal  Effect 
(=4) 
0.036***  0.014***  0.033*** 0.013*** 0.025***  0.010***  0.026***  0.010***  Schooling 
(0.005)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) 
0.003***  0.001***  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.005***  0.002***  0.004***  0.001***  Age 
(0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) 
-0.073***  -0.028***  -0.092*** -0.036*** -0.055***  -0.022***  -0.028  -0.011  Gender: Female 
(0.016)  (0.006) (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.007) (0.017)  (0.007) 
0.004 0.002  0.026  0.010  0.024  0.010  -0.008 -0.003  Marital Status: Single 
(0.021)  (0.008) (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.027)  (0.011) (0.029)  (0.011) 
-0.004 -0.002  -0.014  -0.006  0.013  0.005  -0.004  -0.002  Living with her parents 
(0.017)  (0.007) (0.032)  (0.013)  (0.029)  (0.011) (0.028)  (0.011) 
-0.018  -0.007 -0.054**  -0.021**  -0.016 -0.006  -0.029  -0.011  Employment status: 
Employed  (0.019)  (0.007) (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.009) (0.028)  (0.011) 
-0.077*** -0.029***  -0.095**  -0.037**  0.000  0.000  -0.012  -0.005  Employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.027)  (0.010) (0.037)  (0.015)  (0.035)  (0.014) (0.038)  (0.015) 
0.019*** 0.007***  0.013**  0.005**  0.006  0.002  0.004  0.001  Scale of income 
(0.004)  (0.002) (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.003) (0.008)  (0.003) 
Country  dummies  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year  dummies  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Waves  3, 4  3, 4  3, 4  3, 4  5  5  5  5 
Observations  37,921  37,921  33,898 33,898 21,321  21,321  24,326  24,326 
Country  Waves  67   67    37   37   
Pseudo R2  0.0631     0.0574     0.0554     0.0588    
   
To estimate the sub-samples, we generate the media of “satisfaction with democracy” and “democracy in the country”, and they were considered 
the cut-off points. Their values are show in the Table. Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of choosing the fourth category. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are clustered by country and wave. The row called “Waves” specifies the survey waves 
included in the sample. See Appendix 1 for correspondence of survey wave and year of survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 4 
Measures of Preference for Democracy and Education (Marginal Effects) 
  
  Ordered Probit Regressions (Marginal Effects) 
 Dependent  variable:   
 Agreem.  with  "In 
democracy, economic 




good at maintining 
order" (=4) 
Agreem. with 
"Democracy may have 
problems but is better" 
(=4) 
Importance of living 
in a country that is 
governed 
democratically (=10) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012***  0.016***  Schooling 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) 
0.000 0.000  -0.000***  -0.000***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.003***  Age 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) 
-0.018***  -0.019***  -0.010*** -0.007** -0.018***  -0.019*** -0.012*  -0.013  Gender: Female 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.010) 
0.009** 0.007*  0.004  -0.000  -0.005  -0.013  -0.001 -0.008  Marital Status: 
Single  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)  (0.012) 
-0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009***  -0.010**  0.003  0.010  0.000  -0.001  Living with her 
parents  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)  (.) 
0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.007  0.001  -0.006  Employment status: 
Employed  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.011) 
-0.015*** -0.015***  -0.008**  -0.010*  -0.011  -0.018  -0.009  -0.028  Employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014)  (0.022) 
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.003  -0.001  Scale of income 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.004) 
 0.001   0.002**    0.005***    0.005  Size of town 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.003) 
 0.018***  0.019***  0.039***   0.011  Respect of human 
rights in own 
country 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.009)   (0.012) 
 0.003*  -0.001   0.008**   0.007  Self-positioning in 
political scale   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)   (0.005) 
 0.027***  0.027***  0.060***     Satisfaction with the 
way democracy 
develops 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.010)    
        0.039***  Democracy in own 
country          (0.006) 
Waves  3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 5  5 
Observations  105,417 42,415 107,692 42,914 108,941 43,520 52,766 23,310 
Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of choosing the fourth category, for columns (1) to (6), and the 10
th 
category, for columns (7) and (8).  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are clustered by country and 
wave. The row called “Waves” specifies the survey waves included in the sample. See appendix 1 for correspondence of 
survey wave and year of survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix 5. First Stages of Tables 8 and 9 
 
 OLS  regressions 
  Dependent variable: Years of schooling 
 Table  7  Table  (8) 
  (1)  (3) (1) (3) (5) (7) 
-0.038***  -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.044***  Age 
(0.004)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
-0.144** -0.044  -0.044  -0.061  -0.076  -0.256**  Gender: Female 
(0.058)  (0.083) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.114) 
0.111 0.119 0.006 -0.014 0.013 0.093  Marital Status: Single 
(0.084)  (0.130) (0.120) (0.116) (0.118) (0.132) 
-0.015 -0.008 -0.040  -0.015  -0.023  0.082  Living with her 
parents  (0.056)  (0.074) (0.078) (0.077) (0.074) (0.087) 
0.861***  0.792*** 0.850*** 0.817*** 0.828*** 0.820***  Employment status: 
Employed  (0.095)  (0.117) (0.126) (0.125) (0.133) (0.122) 
0.143  -0.031  0.243* 0.204 0.229* 0.064  Employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.111)  (0.166) (0.128) (0.124) (0.134) (0.212) 
0.459***  0.350*** 0.445*** 0.453*** 0.454*** 0.461***  Scale of income 
(0.029)  (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) 
-0.456***  -0.389*** -0.410*** -0.420*** -0.414*** -0.514***  Number of children 
(0.029)  (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.052) 
-0.646***  -0.787*** -0.531*** -0.519*** -0.534*** -0.748***  Savings: Family just 
got by  (0.056)  (0.088) (0.063) (0.067) (0.068) (0.099) 
-0.352*** -0.576*** -0.321***  -0.349***  -0.323***  -0.359**  Savings: Family spent 
some savings  (0.087)  (0.127) (0.103) (0.105) (0.106) (0.160) 
-0.659***  -0.776*** -0.622*** -0.587*** -0.628*** -0.752***  Savings: Family spent 
savings and borrowed 
money  (0.091)  (0.131) (0.123) (0.120) (0.127) (0.169) 
Constant  9.078*** 8.094*** 11.766*** 11.551*** 11.778*** 12.901*** 
  (1.026)  (0.401) (0.606) (0.634) (0.632) (0.412) 
Observations  127,011  39,090 72,215 73,745 74,076 46,566 
R-squared  0.329  0.330 0.305 0.307 0.317 0.365 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. They are clustered by country and corresponding survey wave. 
These are the results of the first stage regressions of Tables 7 and 8 (using IV). Education is explained by all the 
other controls presented here and the excluded instruments: family savings and number of children.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 